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Supreme Court of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Jack James TRANE, Defendant and Petitioner. 
No. 20010068. 
Sept. 17, 2002. 
Defendant entered conditional guilty plea in the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake, Dennis M. Fuchs, J., 
to possession of controlled substance, and he 
appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and 
defendant petitioned for writ of certiorari. The 
Supreme Court, Russon, J., held that: (1) officers 
lawfully arrested defendant for interfering with peace 
officer, and (2) because the officers lawfully arrested 
defendant, the search incident to arrest, whereby 
officers discovered cocaine on defendant's person, 
did not violate either the Fourth Amendment or the 
State Constitution. 
Affirmed. 
Durham, C.J., concurred in result and filed opinion. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Criminal Law €=^1179 
1 lOkl 179 Most Cited Cases 
On certiorari, Supreme Court reviews the decision of 
the Court of Appeals, not the decision of the trial 
court. 
[2] Criminal Law €=^1179 
110k 1179 Most Cited Cases 
Supreme Court reviews the decision of the Court of 
Appeals for correctness, affording its legal 
conclusions no deference. 
[3] Criminal Law €=>i 134(3) 
HOkl 13.4(3) Most Cited Cases 
Questions of whether an arrest or a search is 
constitutional are questions of law that appellate 
court reviews for correctness. 
[4] Searches and Seizures C~=>23 
349k23 Most Cited Cases 
Fourth Amendment and State Constitution prohibit 
unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 4; Const. Art. 1, § 14. 
[5] Searches and Seizures C^>24 
349k24 Most Cited Cases 
Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless 
undertaken pursuant to a recognized exception to the 
warrant requirement. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 
Const. Art. 1, § 14. 
[6] Arrest €=>71.1(1) 
35k71.1(1) Most Cited Cases 
One recognized exception to the warrant requirement 
is a search incident to a lawful arrest based upon 
probable cause under exigent circumstances. 
[7] Arrest €=>71.1(7) 
35k71.1(7) Most Cited Cases 
Pursuant to the search incident to a lawful arrest 
exception to the warrant requirement, an arresting 
officer may, without a warrant, search a person 
validly arrested. 
[8] Arrest €^>71.1(7) 
3 5k71.1 (7) Most Cited Cases 
For a search incident to arrest to be constitutional, the 
underlying arrest must be lawful, but it does not need 
to be supported by an arrest warrant. 
[9] Criminal Law €^>394.4(14) 
110k394.4(14) Most Cited Cases 
Under search incident to a lawful arrest exception to 
warrant requirement, any evidence, including all 
evidence discovered by serendipity of crimes other 
than that for which the suspect is arrested, is 
admissible in a criminal trial. 
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[10] Criminal Law €^>394.4(4) 
110k394.4(4) Most Cited Cases 
If an arrest violated a defendant's constitutional rights 
under either the Fourth Amendment or the State 
Constitution or was otherwise unlawful, then any 
evidence secured incident to that arrest must typically 
be excluded from a criminal trial pursuant to the 
exclusionary rule. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
[11] Arrest €^71.1(7) 
35k71.1(7) Most Cited Cases 
For purposes of search incident to arrest exception to 
warrant requirement, the underlying arrest is lawful if 
it is supported by probable cause and authorized by 
statute. 
[12] Arrest €=^63.4(1) 
35k63.4(l) Most Cited Cases 
Under both the Fourth Amendment and State 
Constitution, an officer must have probable cause 
before the officer can effect a warrantless arrest. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; Const. Art. 1, § 14. 
[13] Arrest €=^63.4(1) 
35k63.4(l) Most Cited Cases 
Federal Constitution permits an officer to arrest a 
suspect without a warrant if there is probable cause to 
believe that the suspect has committed or is 
committing an offense; however, a suspect does not 
need to be guilty of the offense for which the officers 
arrested the suspect for the officers to have probable 
cause to arrest. 
[14] Arrest €^63.4(15) 
35k63.4(15) Most Cited Cases 
A law enforcement officer has probable cause to 
arrest whenever the crime is committed in the 
presence of that officer because the observing officer 
knows of sufficient facts to believe that the suspect 
committed the crime alleged. 
[15] Arrest €^63.4(15) 
35k63.4(15) Most Cited Cases 
The term "public offense" generally includes 
misdemeanors as that term is used in statute 
providing that peace officer may make an arrest 
under authority of a warrant or may, without warrant, 
arrest a person for any public offense committed or 
attempted in presence of any peace officer. 
U.C.A.1953, 77-7-2(1). 
[16] Arrest €^63.4(15) 
35k63.4(15) Most Cited Cases 
Officers had probable cause and were authorized to 
arrest defendant if defendant committed an offense in 
officers' presence pursuant to statute providing that 
peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a 
warrant or may, without warrant, arrest a person for 
any public offense committed or attempted in 
presence of any peace officer. U.C.A.1953, 77-7-
2(1). 
[17] Arrest €^63.4(15) 
35k63.4(15) Most Cited Cases 
Officers had probable cause and statutory 
authorization to arrest defendant for interfering with 
peace officer because defendant committed this 
offense in officers' presence; defendant, having been 
informed of officers' intentions to frisk and arrest him 
for intoxication and disturbing the peace, began to 
physically struggle with officers to prevent them 
from frisking or arresting him, defendant's physical 
resistance interfered with officers' orders given to 
effect arrest and detention, these acts were sufficient 
to justify officers' arrest of defendant under 
interfering statute, and these events occurred in 
officers'presence. U.C.A.1953, 77-7-2(1), 76-8-305. 
[18] Obstructing Justice €=^3 
282k3 Most Cited Cases 
There is no right to physically resist either an arrest 
or an order of the police, irrespective of the legality 
of the arrest or order, so long as the officers are 
within the scope of their authority. 
[19] Obstructing Justice € " ^ 3 
282k3 Most Cited Cases 
Lawfulness of an officer's order or arrest is not 
determinative of whether an officer is authorized to 
arrest an individual under the interfering with peace 
officer statute. U.C.A.1953, 76-8-305. 
[20] Obstructing Justice € ^ > 3 
282k3 Most Cited Cases 
To determine when an officer is within the scope of 
the officer's authority in making arrest, a court must Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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decide whether the officer is doing what he was 
employed to do or is engaging in a personal frolic of 
his own. 
[21] Arrest €^63.4(15) 
35k63.4(15) Most Cited Cases 
Defendant had no right to physically resist officers' 
order to submit to a search, given that defendant 
knew that officers were police officers conducting a 
routine investigation and pursuing official police 
business, and officers therefore properly arrested 
defendant on that basis; officers were acting within 
scope of their authority, they were called by police 
dispatch to conduct an investigation in response to a 
call from the clerk of a convenience store stating that 
man was harassing store's customers, and by 
investigating dispatch, officers were complying with 
their duties as peace officers, and officers arrived in 
their patrol cars. U.C.A.1953, 76-8-305. 
[22] Arrest €^63.4(15) 
35k63.4(15) Most Cited Cases 
Officers had probable cause and statutory 
authorization to arrest defendant for intoxication 
because defendant committed the offense in presence 
of the officers; officers heard call from police 
dispatch that man was harassing or disturbing 
customers at convenience store, and when officers 
arrived at store, clerk indicated that defendant was 
the individual who had been disturbing others, 
officers each individually and independently noticed 
that defendant smelled of alcohol and exhibited signs 
of intoxication, and officers also noticed that 
defendant was intoxicated enough to potentially pose 
a danger to himself and others. U.C.A.1953, 77-7-
2(1), 76-9-701(1). 
[23] Arrest €^71.1(7) 
35k71.1(7) Most Cited Cases 
Because the officers lawfully arrested defendant for 
both interfering with peace officer and public 
intoxication, the search incident to arrest conducted 
at the jail, whereby officers discovered cocaine on 
defendant's person, did not violate either the Fourth 
Amendment or the State Constitution, and 
accordingly, the cocaine discovered during the search 
was admissible. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; Const. 
Art. 1,§ 14. 
*1054 Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Marian Decker, 
Asst. Att'y Gen., Jennifer D. Barton, Salt Lake City, 
for plaintiff. 
Kent R. Hart, Salt Lake City, for defendant. 
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
RUSSON, Justice: 
U 1 On writ of certiorari, Jack Trane ("Trane") seeks 
review of the court of appeals' decision affirming 
Trane's conviction of possession of a controlled 
substance, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) (2000), in which the court of appeals 
concluded that the trial court's denial of Trane's 
motion to suppress evidence was proper. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
H 2 At 4:15 a.m. on November 26, 1998, police 
dispatch sent out a call that a man was harassing 
customers at a Salt Lake City convenience store. 
Officer Walter Dobrowolski ("Dobrowolski") was 
initially assigned to the call, and Officer Randy 
Bushman ("Bushman") was assigned as back-up. 
Both officers were experienced with intoxicated 
individuals and had experienced situations where 
such individuals became violent. 
H 3 Bushman arrived first in response to the call. 
He noticed Trane standing near the store at a bank of 
public telephones. As *1055 Bushman approached 
the store, the store clerk pointed at Trane, indicating 
that Trane was the focus of the complaint. 
| 4 As Bushman approached Trane, he smelled 
alcohol emanating from Trane's person and breath. 
Bushman suspected that Trane was intoxicated and 
possibly disturbing the peace. Bushman observed 
that Trane "was a little loud considering the time[ 
and] location," was behaving in a "tumultuous-type" 
manner, was using profanity, and was using his hands 
to express himself. Trane "puffed his chest out [and] 
took a defensive posture similar to a boxer" toward 
Bushman. Bushman also noticed that Trane was 
exhibiting some anger and was uncooperative. 
T| 5 Bushman requested Trane's identification. 
Initially, Trane refused to comply, indicating that 
Bushman needed "to deal with" the store clerk 
instead of with him. Specifically, Trane told 
Bushman that he was angry at the store clerk for 
refusing to telephone a taxi for him. After Bushman 
explained that Trane was obligated to identify 
himself, Trane produced a Utah identification card. 
As Bushman attempted to take the card, Trane would Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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not release his grip on it until Bushman ordered 
Trane to relinquish it. 
K 6 About the time Bushman obtained the card, 
Dobrowolski arrived in his patrol car. Bushman 
asked Dobrowolski to watch Trane while Bushman 
returned to his patrol car to check for warrants. 
Concerned for Dobrowolski's safety, Bushman told 
Dobrowolski that Trane had been " less than 
cooperative" and was "trying to talk his way into 
jail." Bushman explained, "I didn't want Officer 
Dobrowolski to step into something without any 
information [that could protect] Dobrowolski's 
personal safety." Dobrowolski asked if Trane had 
been frisked, and Bushman responded negatively. 
f 7 As Dobrowolski approached Trane, Trane 
maintained the "stand that he had with" Bushman. 
Dobrowolski noticed that Trane was swaying, Trane's 
speech was slurred, and Trane's "face had the 
appearance of one who was intoxicated." He also 
noticed that Trane "smelled of alcohol." 
Dobrowolski believed that Trane was disturbing the 
peace and intoxicated. Because Trane was 
intoxicated and Bushman had informed Dobrowolski 
that Trane was belligerent, Dobrowolski "thought that 
the two coupled made [Trane] a possible danger to" 
Dobrowolski and decided to frisk Trane to "ensure 
that he didn't have any weapons." Dobrowolski asked 
Trane to turn around, place his hands behind his 
head, interlock his fingers, and submit to a frisk. 
\ 8 In response to Dobrowolski's frisk request, 
Trane backed up a step, "held his arms away," and 
said, "That ain't happening." After refusing the 
initial request to submit to a frisk, Dobrowolski 
became "more concerned" that Trane "had something 
he didn't want [Dobrowolski] to find that could hurt" 
the officers. When Trane refused to comply with a 
second command to submit to a frisk, Dobrowolski 
informed Trane that if Trane continued to refuse then 
Dobrowolski would compel him to submit. Again 
Trane refused to comply with Dobrowolski's order. 
In response, Dobrowolski told Trane to put his hands 
behind his back because he was under arrest "for 
failure to comply with [Dobrowolski's] order." 
Trane forcibly resisted. Noticing Trane's physical 
resistance, Bushman returned to assist Dobrowolski. 
Dobrowolski took Trane's right arm and Bushman 
took Trane's left arm in an arrest control technique, 
K 9 Trane continued to forcibly resist the officers' 
attempt to compel him to submit "with some struggle 
and some thrashing." As the struggle continued, the 
officers and Trane ended up in the eastbound lanes of 
2700 South, ten to twelve feet from where the 
struggle commenced, where all three "went to the 
ground." The officers struck Trane on the left cheek 
and in the ribs a couple of times during the struggle 
to protect themselves. Eventually, Dobrowolski 
subdued Trane with pepper spray, enabling the 
officers to handcuff Trane. 
11 10 The officers arrested Trane for disturbing the 
peace, public intoxication, and interfering with a 
peace officer. After medical treatment, Dobrowolski 
transported Trane to jail. At the jail, Trane resisted 
attempts to search him, but a "small bindle" of 
cocaine was discovered in his sock 
T| 11 The State charged Trane with possession of a 
controlled substance, a third degree *1056 felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37- 8(2)(a)(i) 
(1998); intoxication, a misdemeanor, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-701(1) (1999); and 
interfering with a peace officer, a misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305(2) (1999). 
Trane moved to suppress the cocaine. In the motion 
to suppress, Trane argued that the police lacked a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal behavior 
to stop him and that therefore "any evidence obtained 
by exploitation of the illegal stop must be 
suppressed." In addition, Trane argued that the 
officers arrested him without probable cause and that 
therefore "the search-incident-to- arrest exception 
cannot justify the subsequent jailhouse search" where 
the cocaine was discovered. 
11 12 1 he trial court concluded that the police had a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion to initially detain 
Trane. The court also concluded that the attempted 
frisk "was proper and supported by Officer 
Dobrowolski's reasonable concern for his safety." 
Finally, the trial court concluded that the police 
properly arrested Trane for disobeying a lawful 
command to submit to a frisk. The court alternatively 
concluded that the arrest was pi oper because the 
police had probable cause or "close to probable 
cause" to arrest Trane for intoxication. Accordingly, 
the trial court denied the motion to suppress, 
concluding, "The subsequent jailhouse search of the 
defendant is justified and proper as a search incident 
to [Trane's] arrest." 
K 13 After the trial court denied Trane's motion to 
suppress, Trane conditionally pleaded guilty to one 
count of unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance pursuant to a plea agreement in exchange 
for the dismissal of the intoxication and interfering 
charges. As part of the agreement, Trane reserved Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the right to appeal the denial ei la* rnohoh w, 
suppress. 
ai'L appea;eo hi^  *. n\\\ KM. •,: - •• \ • 
("osir* ,-t Appeals The >>>-v\ M appeals niled n 
unpublished memorandum decision that the case of 
American Fork City v. Pena-Flores, 2000 UT App 
323, 14 P.3d 698. controlled the outcome of this case. 
State v. Trane, 2000 I'i App *<>0I «: Mm, T 
33250537. In Pena-Flores, the umit -t appcaN 
concluded that an individual can be convicted of 
interfering with an officer in violation of section. 76-
8-305 of the Utah Code if (1) the police act within the 
scope of their authority, and (2) the police order, 
detention, or arrest had. the indicia of lawfulness. 
2000 UI App 323 at 1 11 14 P.3d 698. Relying < >n 
Pena- Flores, the court of appeals explained that " "a 
person can be guilty of interfering with a peace 
officer even when the arrest or detention is later 
determined to be unlawful,' " Trane, 2000 I IT App 
360U, at 2, 2000 WI 33250537 (quoting Pena-
Flores, 2000 UT App 323 at 1| 11, 14 P.3d 698), and 
held that "because the officers were acting within the 
scope of their authority and. the arrest had the indicia 
of lawfulness," Trane was properly arrested undei 
section 76-8-305, the interfering statute. Id. at 2 3 
Accordingly, because the court of appeals held that 
the arrest was lawful, it affirmed the trial court's 
denial of the motion to suppress, holding that the 
search incident to arrest was valid. Id. at 1.-3. 
Because the court of appeals affirmed the trial coin: t 
on that ground, it did not reach the issue of whether 
Trane was properly arrested for intoxication. See id. 
at 3. Irane then petitioned this court for certiorari, 
which we granted. 
]\ 15 Trane argues that the court of appeals erred, by 
misconstruing the plain language of section. 76-8-305 
of the Utah Code because the term, "lawful" in the 
statute "requires the police to have a reasonable 
suspicion for a search or probable cause for an arrest 
before they can arrest persons for interfering" and by 
applying Pena-Flores—which he asserts violates the 
constitutional ban. against unreasonable searches and 
seizures—to this case. Trane also contends thai the 
police lacked, probable cause to arrest him •• 
intoxication and thus any search incident, to arrest 
would be unconstitutional. The State counters that 
the trial court held the attempted frisk was justified; • 
however, even if its lawfulness is debatable, an 
individual has no right to resist an, arrest or a police 
order, and therefore the police pi oner h arrested 
Trane for violating section 76-8-305. Hie State also 
argues that the search at the jail was v; !
 ; u: h 
Page 5 
. .i. tile otiiccrs' aiie^i ui nane lor 
intoxication 
- - • i x 
[1][2][ >] 1 :f ( »n juMoran -AC *e\ie\\ vie decision 
of the court ot appeals, not the decision of the trial 
court." State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 
1.995); see also Taghipour v. Jerez, 2002 UT 74, H 
8, 52 P.3d 1.252. We review the decision of the court 
of appeals for correctness, affording its legal 
conclusions no deference. State v. James, 2000 I IT 
80, 1| 8, 13 P.3d 576. Further, the qi lestions of 
whether an. arrest or a search is constitutional are 
questions of law that we review for correctness. 
Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1199; State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 
**1. S " (Utah 1992). 
ANA i. \ ;>r-
• \PfM H VI ION <• PENA-FI.ORES fO THIS 
< \ s i 
• . . use. -fie Utah Court of Appeals 
affirmed the trial court, relying on American Fork 
City v. Pena-Flores, 2000 UT App 323, 1.4 P.3d 698, 
as controlling precedent and concluding that the 
officers properly arrested. Trane under the interfering 
statute. State v. Trane, 2000 UT App 360U, at 2. The 
court of appeals explained, "Under Pena-Flores, an 
arrest for interfering with a peace officer is valid '[s|o 
long as [ (1) ] a police officer is acting vithin the 
scope of his or her authority and [ (2) ] the detention 
or arrest has the indicia of being lawful.' " Trar 
2000 UT App 360U, at 2 ('alterations in onirir... i 
. (quoting Pena-Flores, 2000 UT App 323 a: f - l 
P.3d 698). Trane contends that the court of appeals 
wrongly decided Pena- Flores, and even if it did not, 
the court of appeals erred in blindly applying Pena-
Flores to this case. However, we do not need to 
decide whether Pena-Flores was wrongly decided 
because that case is inapplicable to the instant case. 
II 18 1 lie issue in Pena-F lores was whether the 
interfering statute, section. 76-8-305 of the Utah, 
Code, required a "lawful arrest or detention." 2000 
I JT App'323 at 1[ 1.0, 14 P.3d 698 (qu.oti.ng Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1.999)). In the instant case, 
' Trane contends that the language of subsection two 
of the interfering statute applies only when an arrest 
or a detention is lawful. Specifically, Trane contends 
that because the interfering statute requires a "lawful 
arrest oi detention," the officers could not legally 
arrest him under the interfering statute for resistance 
to an. i in.la.wfi il order. 
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1f 19 Although Trane's argument is substantially 
similar to the issue in Pena-Flores, the case is 
inapposite. Pena-Flores specifically addressed when 
"a person can be guilty of interfering with a peace 
officer" under section 76-8-305. 2000 UT App 323 
at 1| 11,14 P.3d 698 (emphasis added). In this case, 
Trane was never convicted of violating the interfering 
statute. The actual issue in this case is whether the 
officers had authority and probable cause to arrest 
Trane under the interfering statute. Pena- Flores is 
limited to whether an individual can be convicted of 
violating the interfering statute and does not apply 
when the court is attempting to determine whether 
officers lawfully arrested an individual for allegedly 
violating the interfering statute. Nevertheless, 
because the decision of the court of appeals may be 
sustainable as a search incident to arrest, we now turn 
to that issue. See Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, % 
10, 52 P.3d 1158 (holding that appellate court can 
affirm lower court if judgment is sustainable on 
alternate theory readily apparent from record). 
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY 
INCIDENT TO ARREST 
OF SEARCH 
K 20 The ultimate question on certiorari review is 
whether the police lawfully searched Trane in a 
search incident to arrest. [FN1] If the police lawfully 
arrested Trane, then the search incident to the arrest 
that produced the cocaine was valid and the court of 
appeals properly affirmed the trial court's denial of 
Trane's motion to suppress. 
FN1. The parties dispute whether 
Dobrowolski's original attempt to frisk Trane 
was constitutional under Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 
(1968). However, there is no need to 
address this question because the issue in this 
case is whether the officers properly arrested 
Trane. The officers never actually 
performed the frisk. 
U 21 It is axiomatic that "the right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures embodied in the 
Utah and United States Constitutions is one of the 
most fundamental and cherished rights we possess." 
State v. *1058 Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 303 (Utah 
1998) (footnote omitted). The Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const, amend. IV. The Utah Constitution 
provides virtually identical protections: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the person or thing to be seized. 
Utah Const, art. I, § 14. [FN2] 
FN2. Trane asserted that the officers 
contravened both the Fourth Amendment and 
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
Although this court has previously indicated 
that the analyses are not identical under these 
provisions, see State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 
774, 785 (Utah 1991), Trane did not argue 
that the analyses of these constitutional 
provisions are dissimilar or distinct as 
applied in this case, nor did he argue that the 
Utah Constitution affords him greater 
protection than the United States 
Constitution. In Ramirez, we refused to 
embark on an independent analysis under the 
Utah Constitution when the parties had 
neither argued for nor briefed a separate 
analysis. We explained: 
The parties have not argued for a separate 
analysis under article I, section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution, and therefore, we address 
the issue only under the federal constitution. 
However, that is not to suggest that a 
separate state constitutional analysis might 
not be appropriate. 
817 P.2d at 785 (citations omitted). 
Similarly, the issues on appeal here will be 
analyzed only under the federal constitution 
and existing Utah precedent in which this 
court has applied article I, section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution. State v. Giron, 943 P.2d 
1114, 1120-21 (Utah Ct.App.1997); see also 
State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 988 (Utah 
Ct.App.1994) (stating that "an appellate court 
can decline to address state constitutional 
claims under article I, section 14 if the party 
'fails to proffer any explanation as to how 
this court's analysis should differ' under this 
section from the federal counterpart.") 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, 57 P.3d 1052 Page 7 
(quoting State v. Roth, 827 P.2d 255, 257 n. 1 
(Utah Ct.App. 1992)). 
[4][5][6] H 22 These constitutional provisions 
prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. 
Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992) (citing Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 
L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)). Under these provisions, 
"[warrantless searches are per se unreasonable 
unless undertaken pursuant to a recognized exception 
to the warrant requirement." Brown, 853 P.2d at 855; 
see also State v. Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289, 294 
(Utah 1995) (stating that search without approval of 
judge is unreasonable unless subject to one of" 'a few 
specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions'" (quoting State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 
687 (Utah 1990))); State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 
1382 (Utah 1986) ("[W]e note that the warrant 
requirement is an important check upon the power of 
the State to subject individuals to unreasonable 
searches and seizures and is not to be lightly 
disregarded."). One such recognized exception is a 
search incident to a lawful arrest based upon probable 
cause under exigent circumstances. [FN3] Brown, 
853 P.2d at 855; see also Chimel v. California, 395 
U.S. 752, 762-63, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 
(1969); Banks, 720 P.2d at 1383-84; Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37- 13(3)(a) (Supp.2001). 
FN3. A search of an arrestee's person is 
generally justified and supported by exigent 
circumstances. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 
454, 457, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 
(1981); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 
763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). 
Such searches are justified to protect the 
officers from weapons, to preclude the 
destruction or concealment of evidence, and 
to prevent escape. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 
U.S. 113, 116-18, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 
L.Ed.2d 492 (1998); Belton, 453 U.S. at 457, 
101 S.Ct. 2860; Banks, 720 P.2d at 1384. 
Additionally, in the past we have held that 
"exigent circumstances exist when the safety 
of police officers is threatened." State v. 
Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1237 (Utah 1996). 
Clearly, exigent circumstances existed here 
where Trane began to resist the officers 
physically and violently, thereby placing in 
question their safety and threatening the 
physical well-being of any officers holding 
Trane in custody. 
[7][8][9][10] % 23 Pursuant to the search incident to 
a lawful arrest exception, "an arresting officer may, 
without a warrant, search a person validly arrested." 
Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 35, 99 S.Ct. 
2627, 61 L.Ed.2d 343 (1979); see also State v. 
Lopes, *1059 552 P.2d 120, 121- 22 (Utah 1976). 
For a search incident to arrest to be constitutional, the 
underlying arrest must be lawful, but it does not need 
to be supported by an arrest warrant. Ker v. 
California, 374 U.S. 23, 41, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 
L.Ed.2d 726 (1963). The United States Supreme 
Court explained: 
A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable 
cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth 
Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search 
incident to the arrest requires no additional 
justification. It is the fact of the lawful arrest 
which establishes the authority to search, and we 
hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a 
full search of the person is not only an exception to 
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, 
but is also a "reasonable" search under that 
Amendment. 
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235, 94 
S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (emphasis added); 
see also DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 35, 99 S.Ct. 2627 
(stating that "constitutionality of a search incident to 
an arrest does not depend on whether there is any 
indication that the person arrested possesses weapons 
or evidence. The fact of a lawful arrest, standing 
alone, authorizes a search." (emphasis added)). 
Under this exception, any evidence, including all 
evidence discovered by serendipity of crimes other 
than that for which the suspect is arrested, is 
admissible in a criminal trial. Harris v. United 
States, 331 U.S. 145, 154-55, 67 S.Ct. 1098, 91 L.Ed. 
1399 (1947), overruled on other grounds by Chimel 
v. California, 395 U.S. at 768, 89 S.Ct. 2034. 
However, if an arrest violated a defendant's 
constitutional rights under either the Fourth 
Amendment or the Utah Constitution or was 
otherwise unlawful, then any evidence secured 
incident to that arrest must typically be excluded 
from a criminal trial pursuant to the exclusionary 
rule. Whiteley v. Warden, Wyoming State 
Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 568-69, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 28 
L.Ed.2d 306 (1971); Ker, 374 U.S. at 35, 83 S.Ct. 
1623; Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d at 292; State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991). 
H 24 In this case, Officers Bushman and 
Dobrowolski arrested Trane for interfering with a 
peace officer, public intoxication, and disturbing the 
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the jail, officers searched Trane and discovered 
cocaine on his person. Unmistakably, this was a 
search incident to an arrest, see United States v. 
Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 803, 94 S.Ct. 1234, 39 
L.Ed.2d 771 (1974) (holding that full search of 
person incident to arrest can take place after accused 
arrives at place of detention); Curd v. City Ct. of 
Judsonia, Ark, 141 F.3d 839, 843 (8th Cir.1998) 
(same); Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1, 6 (1st 
Cir.1997) (same), but the remaining question is 
whether the arrest was lawful, State ex rel K.K.C., 
636 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 1981). 
[11] H 25 The underlying arrest is lawful if it is 
supported by probable cause and authorized by 
statute. State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199-1204 
(Utah 1995); see also United States v. Trigg, 878 
F.2d 1037, 1041 (7th Cir.1989). The United States 
Supreme Court explained, "[W]hile a search without 
a warrant is, within limits, permissible if incident to a 
lawful arrest, if an arrest without a warrant is to 
support an incidental search, it must be made with 
probable cause." Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 
98, 102, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959); see 
also State v. White, 577 P.2d 552, 554 (Utah 1978) 
(explaining that arrest justified by probable cause 
supports search incident to arrest). 
[12][13] f 26 Under both the Fourth Amendment 
and article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, an 
officer must have probable cause before the officer 
can effect a warrantless arrest. "[T]he [United States] 
Constitution permits an officer to arrest a suspect 
without a warrant if there is probable cause to believe 
that the suspect has committed or is committing an 
offense." DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 36, 99 S.Ct. 2627. 
However, a suspect does not need to be guilty of the 
offense for which the officers arrested the suspect for 
the officers to have probable cause to arrest. Id.; see 
also Henry, 361 U.S. at 102, 80 S.Ct. 168 (stating 
that "[e]vidence required to establish guilt is not 
necessary" for probable cause to arrest); Brinegar v. 
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 
L.Ed. 1879 (1949) (noting that probable cause to 
arrest is less than that which is required to justify 
conviction). 
% 27 The United States Supreme Court defined 
probable cause justifying an arrest as *1060 "facts 
and circumstances within the officer's knowledge that 
are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of 
reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances 
shown, that the suspect has committed, is 
committing, or is about to commit an offense." 
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 37, 99 S.Ct. 2627; see also 
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 
L.Ed.2d 54 (1975); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 
S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964); Brinegar, 338 
U.S. at 175-76, 69 S.Ct. 1302. Similarly, this court 
explained that in Utah the determination of whether 
the police had probable cause to arrest someone 
without a warrant " 'should be made on an objective 
standard: whether from the facts known to the 
officer, and the inferences [that can] fairly ... be 
drawn therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person in 
[the officer's] position would be justified in believing 
that the suspect had committed the offense.'" State v. 
Cole, 61A P.2d 119, 125 (Utah 1983) (quoting State 
v. Hatcher, 27 Utah 2d 318, 320, 495 P.2d 1259, 
1260 (1972)); see also State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 
1229, 1232-33 (Utah 1996). 
[14] Tf 28 A law enforcement officer has probable 
cause whenever the crime is committed in the 
presence of that officer because the observing officer 
knows of sufficient facts to believe that the suspect 
committed the crime alleged. The United States 
Supreme Court explained, "If an officer has probable 
cause to believe that an individual has committed 
even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, 
he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, 
arrest the offender." Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 
532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 
(2001); see also United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 
411, 418, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) ("The 
cases construing the Fourth Amendment thus reflect 
the ancient common-law rule that a peace officer was 
permitted to arrest without a warrant for a 
misdemeanor or felony committed in his 
presence...."); United States v. Lugo, 170 F.3d 996, 
1003 (10th Cir.1999) (holding that officer's 
observation of suspect committing misdemeanor 
offense afforded officer probable cause and 
legitimate basis to arrest suspect). 
[15][16] U 29 In harmony with this case law 
regarding probable cause for an officer to arrest an 
individual, the Utah Code sets forth circumstances 
under which an officer can effectuate an arrest: 
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority 
of a warrant or may, without warrant, arrest a 
person: 
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted 
in the presence of any peace officer; "presence" 
includes all of the physical senses or any device 
that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any 
physical sense, or records the observations of any 
of the physical sensesf.] 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2(1) (1999) (emphasis 
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Liquor Control Comm'n v. Wooras, 97 Utah 351, 
361- 62, 93 P.2d 455, 460 (1939). The term "public 
offense" under section 77-7- 2(1) generally includes 
misdemeanors. Oleson v. Pincock, 68 Utah 507, 511-
12, 251 P. 23, 24-25 (1926). Accordingly, the 
officers had probable cause and were authorized to 
arrest Trane if Trane committed an offense in their 
presence. 
A. Arrest For Interfering With Peace Officer 
% 30 The officers arrested Trane for interfering with 
an officer in violation of section 76-8-305, which 
provides: 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he 
has knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable 
care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is 
seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that 
person or another and interferes with the arrest or 
detention by: 
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act 
required by lawful order: 
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and 
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or 
detention[.] 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305(1999). 
[17] f 31 In this case, the officers had probable 
cause and statutory authorization to arrest Trane for 
interfering with an officer because Trane committed 
the offense in their presence. As the officers arrived, 
they noticed that Trane smelled of alcohol, swayed, 
*1061 had slurred speech, and otherwise appeared 
intoxicated. They also noticed that Trane was 
"loud," acting in a "tumultuous-type" manner, angry, 
and uncooperative. Both officers believed that Trane 
was intoxicated and possibly disturbing the peace. 
As a result, the officers began seeking to lawfully 
arrest or detain Trane for these crimes. While 
detaining Trane to investigate, Dobrowolski 
requested that Trane submit to a frisk because 
Dobrowolski feared for his and Bushman's safety and 
wanted to ascertain whether Trane had any weapons 
on his person. Nevertheless, Trane refused to comply 
with Dobrowolski's order to turn around, place his 
hands on his head, and submit to a frisk. The 
officers then attempted to arrest Trane. 
1f 32 Trane, having been informed of the officers' 
intentions to frisk and arrest him, began to physically 
struggle with the officers to prevent them from 
frisking or arresting him. Again, Trane's physical 
resistance interfered with the officers' orders given to 
effect the arrest and detention. These acts were 
sufficient to justify the officers' arrest of Trane under 
the interfering statute. See State v. Gardiner, 814 
P.2d 568, 575 (Utah 1991). Not only did these 
events occur in the officers' presence, but they were 
directed toward the officers. Because these events 
occurred in the presence of the officers, they had 
probable cause and were statutorily authorized to 
arrest Trane under Utah Code section 77-7-2(1). 
[18] f^ 33 Despite the foregoing, Trane contends that 
an individual should not be arrested for violating the 
interfering statute when the individual refuses "to 
follow an unlawful order." Because Trane struggled 
with the officers in this case, Trane's argument 
presupposes that an individual can resist, even 
physically, an unlawful arrest or order. However, in 
Utah there is no right to physically resist either an 
arrest or an order of the police, irrespective of the 
legality of the arrest or order, so long as the officers 
are within the scope of their authority. Gardiner, 814 
P.2d at 574; see also State v. Griego, 933 P.2d 1003, 
1006-08 (Utah Ct.App. 1997). 
K 34 In Gardiner, a case involving physical 
resistance, we noted that the justification for the 
common law right to resist an unlawful arrest or 
seizure had disappeared and that therefore the right 
has been repudiated in Utah. 814 P.2d at 573-74 
(stating that right to resist unlawful police conduct 
rejected as defense to crime when common law 
defenses were supplanted by specifically codifying 
recognized defenses). Quoting the New Mexico 
Supreme Court, we stated: 
"Self-help measures undertaken by a potential 
defendant who objects to the legality of the search 
can lead to violence and serious physical injury. 
The societal interest in the orderly settlement of 
disputes between citizens and their government 
outweighs any individual interest in resisting a 
questionable search. One can reasonably be asked 
to submit peaceably and to take recourse in his 
legal remedies." 
Id. at 572 (quoting State v. Doe, 92 N.M. 100, 583 
P.2d 464,466-67 (1978)). 
[19] U 35 The law prefers judicial settlement of 
disputes over street brawls and altercations, even 
when the lawfulness of police conduct is in question. 
Suspects should not be the judges of the lawfulness 
of police action, and redress of an unlawful search or 
seizure, e.g., an arrest not supported by probable 
cause or a detention not supported by a reasonable, 
articulable suspicion of criminal activity, is to be 
obtained in a court of law. Accordingly, the 
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determinative of whether an officer is authorized to 
arrest an individual under the interfering statute. 
[20] [21] H 36 To determine when an officer is 
within the scope of the officer's authority, a court 
must decide whether the "officer is doing what he or 
she was employed to do or is 'engaging in a personal 
frolic of his [or her] own.' " Id. at 574 (quoting 
United States v. Heliczer, 373 F.2d 241, 245 (2d 
Cir.1967)). In this case, Bushman and Dobrowolski 
were acting within the scope of their authority. They 
were called just after 4:00 a.m. by dispatch to 
conduct an investigation in response to a call from 
the clerk of a convenience store, complying with their 
duties as peace officers. The officers arrived in their 
patrol cars. Although it is unclear from the record 
whether the officers were in uniform, Trane knew 
that Bushman and Dobrowolski were police officers 
conducting a *1062 routine investigation and 
pursuing official police business. Accordingly, 
Trane had no right to physically resist the order to 
submit to a search, and the officers therefore properly 
arrested Trane on that basis. [FN4] 
FN4. In her concurrence, Chief Justice 
Durham states that the majority somehow 
concludes that "a person may never refuse 
any order given by an officer, whether that 
order be lawful or not, or take any action, 
passive as it may be, that might impede an 
arrest or detention." Infra f 46. However, 
under the facts of this case, our holding 
above is based upon the officers having 
probable cause to arrest Trane when he 
physically and forcefully resisted and does 
not make the inference that she suggests. 
Chief Justice Durham does not point to any 
wording in which we "unnecessarily suggest 
that the police many never be limited or 
questioned when making an arrest," infra U 
46, nor can she because our opinion is 
limited to the facts of this case. 
B. Arrest for Intoxication 
U 37 The officers also arrested Trane for public 
intoxication in violation of section 76-9-701(1) of the 
Utah Code. The court of appeals did not reach the 
trial court's alternate holding that the officers had 
probable cause or "close to probable cause" to arrest 
Trane for intoxication and that therefore the search 
incident to arrest that uncovered the cocaine was 
valid. Trane contends that the officers lacked 
probable cause to arrest Trane for intoxication 
because the officers did not believe that Trane posed 
a danger to himself or anyone else. A person 
commits the crime of public intoxication under the 
Utah Code when that person "is under the influence 
of alcohol ... to a degree that the person may 
endanger himself or another, in a public place ... 
where he unreasonably disturbs other persons." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-9- 701(1) (1999). 
[22] 1f 38 In this case, the officers had probable 
cause and statutory authorization to arrest Trane for 
intoxication because Trane committed the offense in 
the presence of the officers. Both officers heard the 
call from dispatch that a man was harassing or 
disturbing customers at a convenience store. When 
Bushman arrived at the store, the clerk indicated that 
Trane was the individual who had been disturbing 
others. Trane was in a public place: he was outside 
the convenience store near a bank of public 
telephones. 
% 39 As the officers approached Trane, they each 
individually and independently noticed that Trane 
smelled of alcohol and exhibited signs of 
intoxication. For example, Bushman noticed that 
Trane was "loud" and behaving in a "tumultuous-
type" manner. Dobrowolski noticed Trane was 
swaying, Trane's speech was slurred, and Trane 
appeared intoxicated. 
[23] f 40 The officers also noticed that Trane was 
intoxicated enough to potentially pose a danger to 
himself and others. The officers feared for their 
safety, recognizing from past experiences with 
intoxicated individuals that they could become 
violent. In this case, Trane was angry, was 
uncooperative, had "puffed his chest out [and] took a 
defensive posture similar to a boxer," and initially 
would not release his identification card upon 
Bushman's request. Under such circumstances, the 
officers had probable cause to arrest Trane for 
intoxication. Therefore, because the officers had 
probable cause to arrest Trane for both interfering 
with a peace officer and intoxication, the search 
incident thereto did not violate either the Fourth 
Amendment or article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
f 41 The officers lawfully arrested Trane for both 
interfering with a peace officer and public 
intoxication because they were statutorily authorized 
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Accordingly, the search incident to that arrest 
conducted at the jail was lawful, and the cocaine 
discovered during the search was admissible. Thus, 
the court of appeals properly affirmed the denial of 
Trane's motion to suppress. 
U 42 Associate Chief Justice DURRANT, Justice 
HOWE, and Justice WILKINS concur in Justice 
RUSSON's opinion. 
DURHAM, Chief Justice, concurring in the result: 
K 43 I agree with the majority that the police officers 
in this case had probable cause to arrest Trane for 
public intoxication. I therefore concur that the 
evidence obtained *1063 in the search incident to that 
arrest was properly admitted. The majority goes too 
far, however, in determining that one may properly 
be arrested for interfering under section 76-8-305 
regardless of whether the officer is engaged in a 
lawful arrest or detention. This conclusion is 
unnecessary given the court's holding that there was 
an independent, lawful basis for the arrest in this 
case. Further, the majority's approach implies a rule 
that is unnecessarily confusing and overstates our 
holding in Gardiner. 
H 44 The majority correctly determines that the 
court of appeals' decision in Pena-Flores, 2000 UT 
App 323, 14 P.3d 698, does not apply to this case. It 
does so, however, for the wrong reason. Rather than 
distinguishing Pena- Flores on the grounds that the 
current case involves a lawful arrest, the majority 
complicates the question by observing that Pena-
Flores addressed what makes for a valid conviction 
under the statute, whereas this case considers what 
constitutes a proper arrest under the statute. The 
majority rationalizes this reading, stating that "a 
suspect need not be guilty of the offense for which 
the officers arrested the suspect for the officers to 
have probable cause to arrest." Supra 1f 26. The 
natural implication of the majority's approach is that 
different factors may be considered in determining 
the propriety of an arrest than are considered when 
determining the validity of a verdict under the same 
statute. While it is true that we require different 
standards of proof for arrest and for conviction, we 
have never held that a factor not relevant to weighing 
probable cause is determinative in testing a verdict. 
To the extent that the majority implies that the rule of 
law should vary between arrest and conviction, I 
must disagree. 
K 45 I also cannot agree with the way in which the 
majority applies State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 
(Utah 1991), to the statute at issue here. In Gardiner 
we held that the common-law right to forcefully 
resist an arrest has been repudiated in Utah. Id. at 
573. In that case, the defendant, Gardiner, was 
convicted of assaulting an officer, in violation of 
section 76-5- 102.4, and interfering with an arresting 
officer, in violation of section 76-8-305. Id. at 569. 
The defendant punched an officer who was 
attempting to make an unlawful search and became 
more violent when the officer attempted to arrest 
him. Id. We held that a defendant does not have a 
right to forcefully resist an arrest, whether the arrest 
be lawful or not, so long as the officer is acting 
within the scope of his or her authority and with 
adequate indicia of authority. Id. at 573-75. 
U 46 The statute at issue in the current case prohibits 
more than just forcefully resisting an arrest. It 
prohibits interference in three different forms: 
(1) use of force or any weapon; 
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act 
required by lawful order 
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and 
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or 
detention; or 
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal 
to refrain from performing any act that would 
impede the arrest or detention. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (2001). The majority, 
however, does not refine its holding by tying 
Gardiner 's holding to a specific section of the 
statute, but rather crafts its ruling broadly, concluding 
that "the lawfulness of an officer's order or arrest is 
not determinative of whether an officer is authorized 
to arrest an individual under the statute." [FN1] 
Supra K 35. I would limit the holding to section one 
of the statute. While there is wisdom in concluding 
that a person does not have a right to forcefully resist 
an *1064 arrest, I see no reason also to conclude that 
a person may never refuse any order given by an 
officer, whether that order be lawful or not, or take 
any action, passive as it may be, that might impede 
an arrest or detention. This dicta unnecessarily 
suggests that the police may never be limited or 
questioned when making an arrest. 
FN1. While the majority styles its holding as 
applying to the statute as a whole, it does 
specify that Trane violated section two of the 
statute. It is perplexing, however, why the 
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section two, which prohibits interfering by 
"refusal to perform any act required by 
lawful order," instead of section one, which 
prohibits interference by "force or any 
weapon." Utah Code Ann. § 76- 8-305 
(2001). Surely, the plain language of section 
two—"required by lawful orders-
contemplates that the officer be acting 
lawfully. A narrow reading of that section is 
also suggested by the requirement that the 
officer's order be "necessary to effect the 
arrest or detention" and "made by a peace 
officer involved in the arrest or detention." I 
would hold that Trane's violent acts 
constituted a violation of section one, which 
applies to both lawful and unlawful arrests, 
and leave interpretation of section two for a 
case that is squarely on point. 
U 47 I would hold that Trane was properly arrested 
for public intoxication. I would save the 
interpretation of section 76-8-305 for another day. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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